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Abstract
In 1991, Archie Carroll presented 
the CSR pyramid, which has since 
become a widely recognised 
conceptualisation of corporate social 
responsibility. Responding to recent 
suggestions that understanding 
of the pyramid should be 
evaluated with regard to particular 
organisational contexts, the paper 
proceeds from awareness that 
not all corporations are owned by 
shareholders. Analysing qualitative 
data from consumer co-operatives, 
the authors conceptualise the 
economic responsibilities of these 
and consider them in light of prior 
definition of corporate economic 
responsibilities, to abstract a more 
general definition of corporate 
economic responsibility. The article 
is, to authors knowledge, the first 
one to address the implications of 
organizational form in economic 
responsibilities of a company.
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Introduction
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
has been an important concept in theo-
ry and practice for nearly 70 years. The 
traditional ethos of CSR stems from an 
idea that corporations have further ob-
ligations alongside economic and legal 
ones (e.g., McGuire, 1963; Schwartz & 
Saiia, 2012). Scholarly attention over 
the years has led to various definitions 
and approaches emerging, with one of 
the most important and well-regarded 
conceptual frameworks for CSR being 
that developed in Archie Carroll’s article 
on the topic in 1991 (e.g., Visser, 2006). 
Constructed in the form of a pyramid, 
this four-dimension model was aimed 
at illustrating the whole of CSR. Ever 
since, the CSR pyramid has attracted 
interest from scholars around the world. 
While this model’s applicability across 
contexts is well recognised, modifications 
are often needed for particular contexts. 
For example, in Europe and Africa the 
levels of the pyramid may vary in signifi-
cance (Crane & Matten, 2007; Visser, 
2011), and Spence (2016) as well as Lu 
et al. (2020) have considered the pyramid 
from the perspective of SMEs.
Furthermore, Carroll himself has sug-
gested, in a 2016 article, that there is a 
need to consider how the pyramid should 
be understood in alternative organisa-
tional contexts. He states that the ‘origi-
nal pyramidal depiction of CSR […] was 
clearly done with American-type capital-
istic societies in mind’ (p. 7), alluding to 
a conflict of interest between owners/in-
vestors and other company stakeholders 
that constitutes a widely recognised di-
lemma in discussion of CSR (e.g., Crane 
et al., 2008; Lehtimäki et al., 2011).
Encouraged by Carroll’s recent re-
marks, we applied our awareness that 
not all corpora¬tions are shareholder-
owned (Hansmann, 1996) in following 
B. Flyvbjerg’s recommendation (2006) 
for taking one particular form of incor-
poration as an example to challenge the 
idea of profit maximisation as the pur-
pose of corporations and, with it, the 
corresponding definition of economic 
responsibility. We draw on lessons from 
the context of co-operatives – a unique 
and widespread form of corporation con-
ceptually enshrining a specific set of ideas 
and principles (Jussila, 2013; Novkovic, 
2008) – in applying analysis of empirical 
qualitative data from consumer co-op-
eratives to conceptualise their economic 
responsibilities. The data consisted all 
together 42 interviews of representatives 
of consumer co-operatives’ top manage-
ment and administration. Comparing 
these with standard definition of corpo-
rate economic responsibility, we abstract 
a more general definition of CSR.
Our analysis is of the economic dimen-
sion of the pyramid. This project can be 
seen as a justifiable first step since that 
dimension forms the base for dimensions 
at higher levels (e.g., Carroll, 1979). In 
more revelatory terms, the differences 
emerging between forms of corporations 
imply that the prevailing conceptualisa-
tion of CSR (Carroll, 1991; Schwartz & 
Carroll, 2003) is actually a sub-construct 
and that higher-level abstraction can be 
reached. By uncovering this, we help 
change thinking in the field, not via an 
anti capitalist trick but with a celebration 
of variety.
The research questions guiding us 
toward these ends are simple: 1) what 
are the economic responsibilities of cus-
tomer-owned consumer co-operatives 
(COCs), and 2) what constitute general 
corporate economic responsibilities? We 
begin with scene-setting, by defining con-
sumer co-operatives and explicating their 
role in illustrating the influence of alter-
native company forms in the CSR pyra-
mid. The methodology section specifies 
sub-questions that informed the project’s 
path and the process through which 
the research questions were answered 
through empirical findings. We then 
present the findings, discuss them, and 
articulate our conclusions. As the reader 
may have deduced, our scope is limited to 
addressing the idea that the corporation 
is a tool for the principals (shareholders 
or consumer-owners) to pursue their 
economic self-interest (Jensen & Meck-
ling, 1976).
Refining the Economic Dimension 
of Carroll's CSR Pyramid by Taking 
Organization Form into Account




Carroll’s CSR pyramid is one of the most distinguished and 
cited frameworks to construe the whole of corporate social re-
sponsibility (Visser, 2006). The big idea behind it argues that 
companies have categorically several responsibilities in relation 
to society, and these can be divided in economic, legal, ethical, 
and philanthropic expectations (Carroll, 1991). As Aupperle et 
al. (1985) state, these four categories form interrelated but at 
the same time independent conceptual components of corpo-
rate responsibility. As such, the components can be approach 
together or separately. In light of Carroll’s statement that ‘the 
first and foremost social responsibility of business is econom-
ic in nature’ (1979, p. 500), we find CER as a natural starting 
point for analysing the influence of organizational form on Car-
roll’s CSR pyramid. 
Carroll himself (2016, p. 3) states that economic responsi-
bility is “fundamental condition or requirement of existence, 
[and] businesses have an economic responsibility to the society 
that permitted them to be created and sustained”. According 
to this idea, businesses are not able to act (responsibly) in a 
society without being profitable and ensuring their long-term 
existence. Making profit is also a vital mean to incentivize inves-
tors to invest money in production of goods and services that 
create value for society and consumers (ibid.). As Carroll sees 
economic responsibility of making profit as ensuring the long-
term existence of companies and incentivization of investors, 
we argue that in case of consumer co-operatives the aspect of 
incentivization does not hold. We turn into explaining our po-
sition next.
Co-operative as a Company Form
Co-operatives are an example of member-owned ‘big business 
of a distinctly modern type’ and represent ‘a substantial share 
of the economy in most developed market economies’ (Hans-
mann, 1999, p. 387). Worldwide, co-operative organisations 
boast more than 1,000 million member-owners and provide 100 
million jobs (International Co-operative Alliance, 2019). Most 
importantly, profit maximisation is not the purpose of a co-op-
erative, but rather the value created for its’ member-owners as 
servies users (cf. Michelsen, 1994; Talonen et al., 2016; 2018).
Co-operatives come in several forms, depending on the stake-
holder group that owns them (cf. Talonen, 2018, p. 22). A tra-
ditional categorization of these organizations includes produc-
er-owned (e.g. Figueiredo and Franco, 2018; Ponte and Ewert, 
2009), employee-owned (Webb and Cheney, 2014; Clamp and 
Alhamis, 2010) and consumer-owned co-operatives (COC, 
e.g. Hilson, 2018; Ekberg, 2012). While hybrid co-operatives 
(with more than one stakeholder group as owners) can be es-
tablished, having only one stakeholder group as owner enables 
the company to focus on more homogeneous owner-interests. 
Furthermore, COCs can be divided in retail co-operatives (e.g. 
Hingley et al., 2011), co-operative banks (e.g. Groeneveldt and 
Vries, 2009; Lomi, 1995), and mutual insurane companies (e.g. 
Talonen, 2016; Hansmann, 1985). Thus, analysis can be done 
by taking the industry specific characteristics into account or by 
analysing COCs as a one group of co-operatives that are owned 
by their customers. The latter approach puts emphasis in ana-
lysing the common features of different COCs, which is the lev-
el of analysis that we have chosen. Consequently, our findings 
and conclusions are valid for all COCs although the empirical 
data is drawn from a retail co-operative.  
As an abstract entity, a COC can be defined as consumer-
owners’ tool to get access to a) services and goods that are need-
ed but not otherwise provided in the market and/or obtain b) 
services and goods at fair prices whereas the prices are not fair in 
the absence of a co-operative entity (Jussila et al., 2008). In that 
regard, the idea of COCs is to run businesses ‘not oriented to-
wards earnings in terms of money only, but on members’ “earn-
ings” in terms of concrete services’ (Michelsen, 1994, p. 23). 
Therefore, because the owners’ primary role in this model of 
corporation is that of a user, not a shareholder (or trader), and 
since the model is oriented not toward profits and higher (or 
changing) stock prices but toward better terms of trade for the 
consumers (Borgen, 2004; Spear, 2004), corporate economic 
responsibilities different from those presented in Carroll’s 1991 
work are to be found. Thereby, discussion of co-operatives’ 
purpose and responsibilities can be nurtured more broadly, and 
scholars can develop metrics by which the workings of COCs’ 
CSR activities can be evaluated – one not bound up with the 
market value of the firm (Mackey et al., 2005).
Methodology
To pinpoint knowledge gaps and begin filling them in detail 
(Siggelkow, 2007), we chose to build our research in the form 
of a case study (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). Following an 
interpretive research approach (Van Maanen, 1979), we gave 
a voice to key representatives of top management and govern-
ance bodies, to afford an insider perspective on the purpose and 
responsibilities of consumer co-operatives. Their ideas, associa-
tions, and analyses provide the cases in our study.  
Through our research setting of consumer co-operatives in 
Finland’s S Group associa¬tion, we join the researchers who 
use Finnish data to inform administrative science (e.g., Vaara, 
2001; 2003; Vaara & Tienari, 2002). The choice of country is 
quite noteworthy with regard to the aims of our study. In a little 
over a century, Finnish retail co-operation has come a long way, 
from small village co-operatives to large-scale businesses, and 
the S Group – with a mission statement referring to a quest for 
customer-owner value – is often presented as the most success-
ful example.
At the end of 2018, the S Group had almost 2.4 million 
members (where the entire population of Finland came to ap-
proximately 5.5 million) and was the country’s market leader 
for daily consumer goods, with an exceptionally high market 
share: 46.4% in 2018. Financially, the group is on solid foot-
ing. In 2018, the S Group’s retail sales amounted to EUR 11.5 
billion and its total profit before extraordinary items was 355 
million euros. Members were paid 372 million euros in ‘bonus-
es,’ and the group’s investments totalled 589 million euros (S 
Group, 2019).
Collection of the Data
Our research can be seen as longitudinal in that the process be-
gan back in 2004 with pilot interviews (see Fielding, 1993) in-
volving co-operation researchers and also former managers and 
board members of S Group member co-operatives. The main 
objective for these interviews, which the first author conducted 
with an interview guide rooted in inductive thematic analysis of 
non academic literature on the ideas and principles of co-oper-
ation, was to gain knowledge and understanding of the research 
context and to ascertain the research questions’ relevance to the 
interviewees. To afford a comprehensive picture of COCs and 
their purpose, the selection of interviewees was based on can-
didates’ track record and their known expertise in co-operative 
organisations. In other words, we used information-oriented 
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selection (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Flyvbjerg, 2006). 
To develop our understanding of consumer co-operation 
further, the first two authors continued the process with addi-
tional tape-recorded thematic interviews (see Silverman, 1997), 
in 2005. These were followed, in 2007, with a research assis-
tant’s in-depth interviews of 22 people who each chaired the 
supervisory board of an S Group co-operative. These subjects 
were chosen because they regularly engaged in abstraction pro-
cesses focused on the purpose and economic responsibilities of 
COCs – the boards are responsible for defining the respective 
organisations’ frameworks for strategy. At that stage, the idea 
motivating this paper was already forming.
The body of qualitative data (e.g., Denzin & Lincoln, 1994) 
analysed in our process was amassed from considerable archival 
material (e.g., annual reports, books, and personnel magazines) 
and the above-mentioned 42 interviews with experts in co-op-
eration and actors representing various levels and areas within 
the organisations (several CEOs, the 22 supervisory board 
members of individual co-operatives, and managers of the as-
sociation of co operatives).
Such factors as the networks involved made it especially im-
portant to assure interviewees’ anonymity. This was handled 
in all stages through an oral agreement, usually supported by 
a briefing on research ethics. As for other material, the inter-
pretation in our first order analysis of the agency-theory-linked 
purpose and economic responsibilities of COCs gave a voice to 
only the interviewees, not producers of other source material 
(the creators of the archived textual material). However, the 
formulation of more theoretical interpretations (Van Maanen, 
1979) was informed by all the data, with the interview content 
still in the primary role (as the unit of analysis).
The Analysis Process
In 2012, we conducted theoretical analysis of the data, using 
Carroll’s (1991) definition of corporate economic responsibil-
ity (CER) as the basis for the following specific sub questions: 
1) For satisfying the immediate expectations of the consumer-
owners, what is important in COCs’ performance? 2) What is 
important with regard to COCs’ commitment if one wishes to 
ensure the capacity to satisfy consumer-owner expectations in 
the long term? 3) What is vital in a COC’s market strategy for 
creating value for consumer-owners? 4) What efficiency-related 
elements are key to creation of consumer-owner value? 5) Fi-
nally, for generating that value, what is important in terms of 
the chosen concept of success?
In the attempt to construct a valid and reliable study, the first 
two authors began by examining the data systematically to ar-
rive at a preliminary understanding of economic responsibilities 
in this particular context. Next, we organised the data along 
the outlines provided by Carroll in 1991. The aim of this analy-
sis was to capture important aspects in relation to the above 
sub-questions. More detailed analysis followed, in which we 
intertwined our data with literature on corporate economic 
responsibility and corporate purpose with regard to consumer 
co-operation. To afford development of a trustworthy analy-
sis procedure, we met to discuss the data and our interpreta-
tions to ascertain whether we agreed on the inclusion of data 
connected with particular themes. Also, our understanding of 
Carroll’s model developed through the interplay of data, lit-
erature, and emerging theory, with several reorganisations and 
clarifications emerging (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). This 
process included iterative and joint writing. Finally, researcher 
triangulation entailed a third and fourth author joining our ef-
fort – with the preparation of this manuscript representing the 
ultimate outcome.
Before we turn our attention to the findings, it should be not-
ed also that the analysis process included the first two authors 
engaging in several discussions with S Group executives and 
other co-operation experts (e.g., leaders of the Pellervo Confed-
eration of Finnish Cooperatives) to check the interpretations 
formed. The findings and theoretical formulations presented 
in the paper were presented to co-operative practitioners at a 
governance seminar too. The feedback indicated both insider 
agreement with our interpretations and excitement about our 
formulations.
The Findings
This section presents ideas as to COCs’ economic responsibili-
ties as derived from our data and ties them in with earlier con-
cepts of CER. Our discussion is anchored in Carroll’s five com-
ponents of CER, which formed the basis for our study. As this 
discussion unfolds, we elaborate an aggregate conceptualisation 
of CER that fits the agency-theoretical purpose of COCs.
Satisfying the Owners' Immediate Expectations
In his 1991 definition of economic responsibilities, Carroll 
maintains: ‘It is important to perform in a manner consistent 
with maximizing earnings per share’ (p. 40). Relative to our first 
sub-question, this notion seems to reflect the agency-theoretical 
purpose of shareholder corporations (Friedman, 1970; Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976), highlighting the central place of financial 
capital, the role of the shareholders as providers of that capi-
tal, the criteria employed in rewarding the principals for their 
contribution, and the role of profit as the foundation for the 
rewards. According to R.F. Duska (1997), shareholders ‘don’t 
usually ask what goods or services the companies they invest 
in produce, but rather inquire what return on their investment 
the company pays’ (pp. 1401–1402). Accordingly, maximising 
earnings per share is linked to the immediate expectations of 
the shareholders (and market analysts; see Mintzberg et al., 
2002). As the portion of a company’s profit allocated to each 
outstanding share of common stock, per-share earnings are also 
among the key factors in stock prices (Bierman & Hass, 2009) 
– a variable of continuous concern for managers of shareholder 
corporations (Davis, 2009). 
According to our informants, the agency-theoretical purpose 
of COCs is very different from that of shareholder corporations 
and integral to the mechanisms via which the owners (princi-
pals) benefit. As one interviewee articulated,
[w]hen members start a co-operative, they start it not for 
showing profits but for producing services and benefits for 
themselves […]. It gives the possibility of using the services, 
and the more they use them the more they benefit […]. If the 
co-operative happens to show a profit, members may return 
that to themselves. But in listed companies the usage of services 
does not normally have a function; in them, you just think about 
how much of a dividend you get for your shares and how the 
share price develops […]. That is a totally different philosophy.
 
This is consistent with J. Michelsen’s (1994) statement that in 
co-operatives ‘it is members’ needs rather than the amount of 
capital they have invested which constitute the material founda-
tion of the enterprise’ (p. 23). According to P. Normark (1996), 
this distinction is one of the key differences between COCs 
and shareholder corporations. As the above extract illustrates, 
the idea is that consumers pool their limited capital resources 
EJBO Electronic Journal of Business Ethics and Organization Studies Vol. 26, No. 1 (2021)
20 http://ejbo.jyu.fi/
(participation shares) in the co-operative primarily to create po-
tential for benefits through use. The participation-share-based 
compensation is typically limited (Jussila et al., 2008); that is, 
the role of user predominates over that of shareholder. On the 
other hand, a similarity exists in that the owners’ rights are cen-
tral to defining the corporate purpose, as this comment from 
the interview data attests:
Ownership brings a right for benefits; [it] guarantees services.
It is noteworthy that, since ‘owners cannot generally sell their 
shares at a market price’ (Nilsson, 2001, p. 336), speculative 
trade is removed from the picture. Instead of buying and sell-
ing in the financial markets (a typical household activity in a 
finance-driven economy; see Davis, 2009), member-owner 
households concentrate on transacting in the consumer market, 
accumulating benefits through the use of their co-operative’s 
services. Hence, the co-operative has a responsibility ‘to con-
duct concrete activities in such a way as to maximize satisfac-
tion of members’ needs’ (Michelsen, 1994, p. 23), as highlighted 
by one informant:
We are not merely to maximise the bottom line 
of the co-operative; for us, it is more impor-
tant to maximise the service for the member.
As the members’ needs are satisfied in transactions between 
member and co-operative, it is vital that a COC perform in 
such a manner as to maximise the member benefits per trans-
action. In our data, the benefits (i.e., better terms of trade) are 
identified as including, for example, a more extensive network 
of shops, better assortments, lower prices, better bonuses, and 
patronage refunds. The insignificance of shareholding as a basis 
for rewarding individuals is highlighted by the fact that retained 
profits are common property, to which no individual member 
has a right (Nilsson, 2001). 
Securing the Capacity for Long-Term Value Creation
As for our second sub-question, Carroll states: ‘It is important 
to be committed to being as profitable as possible’ (1991, p. 40). 
The rationale for this responsibility is explained by I. Wilson: 
‘[T]he private corporation must be a profit-making organiza-
tion. Without profit, its existence will be brief and troubled’ 
(2004, p. 23). A highly profitable corporation is not only likely 
to survive but capable of rewarding the shareholders in the fu-
ture with large returns on their investment.
In other words, this component is future-oriented and di-
rects attention to the decisions that are going to affect company 
profitability. As posited by Schwartz and Carroll (2003), an or-
ganisation’s actions fall outside the economic domain of CSR 
‘if they are not intended to maximize profit (or minimize loss) 
when a more profitable alternative exists’ (p. 509). Among the 
possible manifestations of commitment to being as profitable 
as possible are closing down unprofitable factories and mov-
ing low-profit operations to more profitable markets (Davis, 
2009). This focus encourages expectations of higher earnings 
per share, another key factor in determination of stock prices 
(Bierman & Hass, 2009). Positive reactions of the stock market 
to such decisions provide evidence of this every day.
As indicated above, co-operatives do not create value for the 
consumer-owners primarily through profit. Rather, this is done 
by creating transaction benefits for them. Therefore, profitabil-
ity plays a different role in COCs than in shareholder corpora-
tions. Since ‘it is the household’s bottom line that is [of] prima-
ry interest to the owners of a consumer co-operative’ (Jussila et 
al., 2008, p. 33), there is no use in making the greatest possible 
profit in transactions with the customers. In consequence, an 
activity of a COC that is not aimed at maximising profit (di-
rectly or indirectly) is not, as Schwartz and Carroll’s (2003) 
work might lead one to conclude, indicative of a non-economic 
motive or of a flawed business decision. In fact, such action in a 
COC context may represent an excellent business decision, as 
the logic of operation is different:
Making profits and improving our equity ratios is not 
what we are for; our goal is not to puff out with our ba-
lance sheets but to create benefits to members, and, 
in my opinion, the benefits are concretised best with 
a good service network, ever better services.
Profitability does, however, play a role in COCs. It is simply a 
‘means to an end rather than an end in itself’ (Cornforth, 2004, 
p. 15), as illustrated in this interview extract:
The main purpose of shareholder corporations is to make 
maximum profit, and to us that clearly is not the main purpose 
[…]. Our purpose is to make a ‘profit’ to the extent needed to 
make investments in developing services for our members.
It is important that, instead of making a commitment to being 
as profitable as possible, a COC is committed to being profit-
able enough to maintain its capacity to create benefits for the 
members in the future. Such commitment can be seen as con-
tributing to growth in the amount of the expected benefit per 
transaction.
In this connection, it is worth noting that the pressure not to 
‘miss a quarter’ in the context of shareholder corporations – i.e., 
not to upset the expectations of market analysts (Mintzberg et 
al., 2002, p. 70) – may feed the kind of greed and excessive risk-
taking witnessed on Wall Street and culminating in financial 
crises. According to M.C. Jensen (2002, p. 245), ‘short term fi-
nancial performance (usually profits, or sometimes even more 
silly, earnings per share) […] is a sure way to destroy value’ and 
jeopardise the entity’s long-term existence. If shareholder cor-
porations go too far in this direction (e.g., in response to dis-
torted executive incentives), they fail to create value for their 
owners in the long term.
According to our data, COCs do not display such a problem. 
Instead, they are able to develop their operations patiently, an 
approach that can provide them with competitive advantage:
In listed companies, you have to show good results in eve-
ry quarter, and our main competitor has to pay maximum 
dividends from annual results. And in a co-operative you 
do not have that kind of necessity, so you have the patien-
ce to make medium results even for many years to build 
the network of business locations. We do not have to 
operate on so short-term a basis, and that is a major ad-
vantage in an investment-based business such as this.  
That is consistent with the findings of Liljeblom and Vaiheko-
ski (2010), according to whom co-operatives are likely to have 
a more long-term focus when compared to listed firms, which 
may ‘in general be subject to higher short-term pressure due to 
relatively high ownership stakes by short term investors such 
as mutual funds, and activist owners’ (p. 242). Our dataset also 
attests that no gimmicks are needed, with the financial media 
showing no interest in co-operatives. This is in line with J. Nils-
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son’s (2001) statement that ‘as the co-operative residual claims 
are not marketable, no stock analysis specialists can reasonably 
have any interest in them’ (p. 335). On the negative side, the low 
interest on the part of these media has probably contributed 
to the heretofore marginal interest shown in co-operatives by 
academia.
It is noteworthy that shortsightedness has been identified as 
able to jeopardise future member value also in COCs. Consum-
ers-owners could become greedy and demand ever lower prices, 
business outlets in places where production costs cannot be re-
couped, or patronage refunds that put economic sustainability 
at risk. For instance, one CEO interviewed said:
There is possibly a threat that the membership become 
greedy, selfish, and grasping, such that they want it all for 
themselves in terms of patronage refunds and, thereby, sha-
re away those resources we need to develop the operation.
Nilsson explains the possibility of shortsightedness as follows: 
‘As the residual rights cannot be transferred upon the with-
drawal of a member, the planning horizon of members is re-
duced. Because members are not specifically motivated to think 
in the long term, they are concerned with what their member-
ship offers “right now”’ (2001, p. 338). According to our data, 
members do sometimes raise their voices to demand more in 
the short term. In these cases, key representatives of the govern-
ing bodies must take action in concert with the management:
We have to explain to the members why the co-operative 
must make a certain amount of profit and why we cannot 
pay it all out in bonuses. It has to be explained […] that 
the co-operative needs a small amount for itself and for its 
operation and investments […]. The amount of the surp-
lus has to be adequate, so that we can invest in the future.
Echoing the work of Lan and Heracleous (2010), our interpre-
tation is that, with regard to ensuring the capacity for long-term 
value creation, the co-operative itself can be seen as the princi-
pal.
Market Strategy
With regard to the component of economic responsibility, as-
sociated with our third sub-question, Carroll states: ‘It is im-
portant to maintain a strong competitive position’ (1991, p. 
40). This strategic component is in line with the notion that 
competitive position in markets is a central element in a corpo-
ration’s profitability, where a strong position is associated with 
high profits (Porter, 1985). Accordingly, imperfect competition 
in general and a monopoly position in particular are seen as ide-
al for a corporation seeking to maximise profits. If customers do 
not have a choice, there is little incentive for such a corporation 
to mark down its products or services, and the more customers 
are willing (or forced) to pay, the greater the value created for its 
shareholders. This line of thinking by Porter (1985) is consist-
ent with the structure–conduct–performance model, in which 
positive correlations exist among market concentration, barri-
ers to entry, and profits (Ajlouni, 2010; Bain, 1951).
While Carroll (1991) does not mention industry and market 
attractiveness, the other components central to a firm’s profita-
bility, Porter (1985) maintains that the principle of shareholder 
corporations is to operate in those industries and markets that 
are most attractive in terms of the level of profitability offered. 
Therefore, if the rate of return available in a given part of the 
economy is less than a competitive rate possible elsewhere, that 
field may lack service providers even if supplying services there 
would be profitable (Fulton & Hammond-Ketilson, 1992). 
Further, where the rate of return available dips to below what 
the shareholders desire or expect, the corporate agent would be 
expected to cease providing the goods and services. This renders 
it unsustainable from the consumer (community) point of view.
Per our data, COCs take another approach to competition 
and markets. In fact, COCs exist to counteract failures in the 
consumer market (Jussila et al., 2008; Normark, 1996). They 
are tools by which consumers secure provision of certain goods 
and services when no other actor in the market chooses to pro-
vide them:
We invest in business locations in which any other actor in 
the retail business would not even think of building a new 
unit. We invest to provide services in such municipalities.
Illustrating the difference between COCs and shareholder cor-
porations, one interviewee stated:
[T]he consumer co-operative society must 
be the last to turn off the lights. 
In other words, it is the COC’s responsibility to maintain the 
supply of the goods and services when shareholder corporations 
or other actors leave a market. When a market is in decline, the 
COCs is not oriented to seeking more attractive environments; 
after all, ‘the purpose of a co-operative is to serve […] its mem-
bers, by carrying out its chosen trade’ (Davies & Burt, 2007, p. 
159). As a members’ representative we interviewed said, 
[w]e are members and use services, so the first precondi-
tion for it is that the store does exist. We cannot go to a 
store, pub, or hotel if it does not exist. So the coverage of 
the network... there has to be the store. From the perspec-
tive of a member, this is probably the most central issue.
In that respect, COCs may be seen as occupying what Higgins 
and Currie (2004) refer to as the original role of business in so-
ciety. Through these self-help organisations, consumers assume 
responsibility for their own destiny. Instead of letting other ac-
tors and stock markets ‘run the show’ (cf. Davis, 2009), they 
themselves arrange provision of the goods and services needed.
At the same time, as indicated earlier in the paper, our data 
also emphasise that COCs are not supposed to have a business 
unit in every possible location and that it is not acceptable (in 
the long term) to maintain business units that produce losses. 
Doing so would not be sustainable or demonstrate to their 
members a commitment to long-term value creation. In fact, in 
principle, a co operative may even educate its members to nur-
ture a well-functioning market by actively calculating their pref-
erences from among the various co-operative business units.
Where H. Hansmann (1999) has identified firms as often 
holding some degree of monopoly power in dealing with their 
customers, the function of a COC may lie in providing ‘a prod-
uct or service at a competitive price in a situation where true 
competition does not exist’ (Fairbairn et al., 1991, p. 22). While 
shareholder corporations comb through alternative markets in 
pursuit of profitability, COCs examine new areas of business 
to assess whether there is potential for greater benefit for the 
members (e.g., on account of market failures). If competition 
is highly limited, shareholder corporations will face little pres-
sure to set their price offers close to the actual costs. Thereby, 
the production of goods and services is not very efficient from 
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customers’ perspective. A COC entering such a market encour-
ages lower prices to emerge through the process of reciprocal 
decisions among competitors (i.e., from competition). This was 
made clear in our data by a supervisory board chair, for instance:
When a consumer co-operative acts in the markets, it forces 
other actors [...] / competitors to operate more efficiently and in 
accordance with a more consumer-friendly philosophy. When 
consumer co-operation has thrived […], it has strongly affected 
the operation of markets such that also those customers who do 
not use the services provided by the co-operative get better ser-
vices, from other companies, when competition and the example 
set by a consumer co-operative enforces better operation by 
others too […]. [I]t also prevents monopoly pricing, or at least 
restrains it, when we operate efficiently and are competitive.
Thus, a consumer co-operative’s success as a barometer for 
competition (e.g., Cotterill, 1984) leads to favourable market 
conditions for all consumers, improving the situation of non-
members as well (Normark, 1996). At the same time, to be 
successful a COC needs to hold a strong competitive position. 
Otherwise, it cannot influence the market to the benefit of the 
members and other consumers.
It is noteworthy that competitive advantage is not defined in 
Porterian terms in COCs – i.e., in terms of long-term above-
average profit (Porter, 1985). Instead, a COC is seen as holding 
a competitive advantage when ‘it is consistently its customer-
owners’ best and first choice,’ as one CEO said in an interview. 
The paradox here is that, as the idea of COCs is to work toward 
increasing the surplus for consumers, they must look upon com-
petition favourably. Comments by two CEOs are illustrative:
I must say that competition is good, and here we have 
tough competition […]. Of course, it would not be good 
[…] if we had only one retailer group […]. [It is] important 
that this is not like some kind of ancient Soviet system.
We do not act to kill competition; we must have points of com-
parison, and a monopoly situation is on no account our goal.
Indeed, S Group’s actions push competitors to develop new 
products, services, and technologies. Consumers thus obtain 
a wider selection and better products. The resulting feedback 
process was characterised by a CEO in our dataset as follows:
We are in very intensive competiti-
on in each of our lines of business.
Clearly, it is important for a COC to maintain a well-func-
tioning consumer market by utilising, among other things, its 
strong competitive position.
Efficiency
In comments related to our fourth sub-question, Carroll states 
the following with regard to economic responsibilities: ‘It is im-
portant to maintain a high level of operating efficiency’ (1991, p. 
40). There are diverse ways to define and measure operation ef-
ficiency, many of which follow the tradition of measuring an or-
ganisation’s performance via an array of ratios between outputs 
and inputs (Eilon, 1985), such as total asset turnover (net sales 
/ average total assets). The foregoing discussion points toward 
two means of increasing operating efficiency. Firstly, Kudyba 
and Vitaliano (2003) find that corporations may increase their 
operating efficiency through appropriate use of productive re-
sources (a source of costs for them), thereby increasing their 
operating income (the company’s earnings from core operations 
less its costs for goods sold and general operating expenses; see 
Weston & Copeland, 1986). A widely accepted way of judg-
ing profitability follows these lines. Secondly, firms may show 
better efficiency by raising prices. Alongside productivity im-
provements, a more favourable price structure has potential to 
contribute to an increase in business profits (Grifell-Tatjé & 
Lowell, 1999).
Our dataset shows that operating efficiency as defined above 
does not mesh with the principle of COCs. Since the COC 
model is not centred on a quest for profits, a COC is not sup-
posed to pursue greater operating efficiency via price hikes. In 
contrast, the idea is to focus on applying production resources 
in a manner facilitating provision of lower prices for consumers. 
One respondent said the following in connection with this:
A clear measurement in, for example, market tra-
de is that in all of our chains we attempt to main-
tain a price level that is two per cent lower than that 
of the corresponding chains of our competitors.    
This represents an important distinction between COCs and 
shareholder corporations, one with strong measurement impli-
cations. A different numerator (output) should be used. If prof-
it is taken as the numerator, similar or even more efficient use of 
production resources may yield a lower figure for operating effi-
ciency in COCs as compared to shareholder corporations. False 
conclusions as to their relative efficiency could follow. Our data 
speak in favour of a more appropriate numerator for the meas-
urement of COCs’ operating efficiency, such as the surplus for 
consumers. According to Fairbairn et al. (1991), this surplus 
indicates ‘how much the members’ benefit, in total, from both 
the savings they make in the form of lower prices and the sav-
ings they make from patronage refunds from the co-operative’ 
(p. 127).
COCs are sometimes believed to be inefficient in that, since 
they need not bow to pressures of quarter-based economics 
(Jussila et al., 2008), they may not be pressed to cut costs imme-
diately whenever the savings turn out to be less than in equiva-
lent shareholder corporations (Mintzberg et al., 2002). Accord-
ing to our informants, however, this logic does not always hold:
If a consumer co-operative operates inefficiently […], it would 
be better that it not even exist. If it operates less efficient-
ly than the market players’ average, this leads to a situation 
wherein either the other players may gain monopoly-type 
profits through overpricing or the whole industry may ope-
rate inefficiently, which is not to the benefit of the customer 
[…]. [T]he core purpose and central mission of consu-
mer co operation is to be efficient in the marketplace.
This is consistent with literature on co-operatives that cites 
economy as one of the core ideas behind co-operation (e.g., 
Jussila, 2013). One thing that helps consumer co-operatives 
reach high operating efficiency is that COCs may ‘concentrate 
on the long-term development of an efficient organization 
[when] it comes to the provision of particular goods and ser-
vices’ (Jussila et al., 2008, p. 33). Thereby, a COC can actually 
be more efficient than shareholder corporations that have lost 
sight of long-term benefits by having their eyes, as Mintzberg 
and colleagues put it, ‘on the scoreboard instead of the ball’ 
(2002, p. 70). 
EJBO Electronic Journal of Business Ethics and Organization Studies Vol. 26, No. 1 (2021)
23 http://ejbo.jyu.fi/
The Definition of Success
Finally, turning to our fifth subsidiary research question, we 
consider Carroll’s statement that ‘[i]t is important that a suc-
cessful firm be defined as one that is consistently profitable’ 
(1991, p. 40). With this component, related explicitly to con-
ceptualisation, he presents the concept of success and what 
it ought to be in the mental frames of strategists (Mintzberg, 
1987) working for an economically responsible shareholder 
corporation. Accordingly, this component can be seen as hav-
ing particular theoretical and educational reach with regard to 
promoting the realisation of the purpose of a share¬holder cor-
poration. It is noteworthy also for seeming to highlight orienta-
tion to the longer term.
Against the backdrop of contemporary business discourses 
(Duska, 1997) and business-school education (Fontrodona & 
Sison, 2006), it is unlikely that shareholder corporations will 
find it difficult to define success through profitability, even if the 
aspect of long-term focus may pose a challenge. This approach 
can be over-extended, however, with COCs feeling tempted to 
define success similarly since theory tends to assume all busi-
nesses to be shareholder corporations. The risk here is that ‘if 
the top management believes that the co-operative is like any 
other business (in quest for maximum profit), the co-operative 
is unlikely to realize its mission’ (Tuominen et al., 2010, p. 12; 
see also Talonen et al., 2018). Thus far in the case context, co 
operative principles and associated ideas have proved strong 
enough: 
Those professional, slightly cynical managers who come from 
the world of business schools as professionals in business […] 
eventually become co-operators, when they notice that this 
ideology works for real. And it was a surprise to many, and 
today our CEO is extremely committed to the basic idea of 
co-operation and sees that rewarding the member is the basic 
principle – what, in his view, we are doing. And it is visible 
everywhere that he is managing not one firm among many 
but a consumer co operative with co-operative premises. 
Nonetheless, completing the list of COCs’ economic respon-
sibilities demands a definition particular to a successful COC. 
Our data suggest that, consistently with the responsibilities 
presented above, a successful COC is one that is consistently 
beneficial to its members and also seen as such by them, while 
simultaneously accumulating the resources required for main-
taining a positive spiral:
A successful co-operative retailer, an economically successful 
co-operative retailer, guarantees success also to the member. 
The better the co-operative does in the economic and opera-
tional sense, the greater the benefits for the member also. 
When it does well economically […], it provides the ser-
vices to the member as efficiently as possible, and then the 
member commits, buys them […], then it goes in both direc-
tions – the member has obtained the insight that the more 
he or she commits him- or herself to the co-operative, the 
more he or she benefits and that the more he or she com-
mits, the better the co-operative does. So it’s reciprocal.
Furthermore, consistent with the COC literature (e.g., 
Tuominen et al., 2009), our dataset suggests that profit is not 
the best indicator of success for COCs and that their manage-
ment performance cannot ‘be judged simply by examining the 
firm’s net financial earnings’ (Hansmann, 1999, p. 398).
A COC’s performance can be measured instead in terms of 
total benefits generated by the co-operative for its members 
(Fairbairn et al., 1991). Market share and the proportion of the 
relevant population who are members can be used as additional 
indicators of success: 
[Our] measures of performance quantify especially the benefits 
the members get and how we succeed in [generating these].
Through market share, we [can judge] that the services are 
attractive and the benefits concrete enough that the mar-
ket share rises […]. While the number of members is un-
limited [in theory], the higher the market share, the more 
members it has and the better the co-operative has succee-
ded in its mission […]. If the co-operative succeeds in its 
mission, the number of members will rise all the time.  
Such definitions and metrics are consistent with the work of 
Fairbairn et al. (1991), who posit that it is important to ‘guide 
a co-operative to the decisions that maximize the well-being of 
the members, not the financial well-being of the co-operative 
itself’ (p. 24). These can be viewed as particularly important in 
light of cases, such as those discussed by M. Fulton (1999), in 
which a COC has not fulfilled its economic responsibilities, in 
consequence of an implicit notion that the members have a duty 
to support an unsuccessful COC. Defining a COC as consist-
ently beneficial to its members can be regarded as one means of 
better aligning the series of actions with the purpose.
A General Concept of Economic Responsibility
At the outset, we asked what economic responsibilities a COC 
has and what constitute corporate economic responsibilities 
in general. Addressing these overall questions below, we be-
gin with a summary of our findings in the COC context and 
consider them in terms of Carroll’s components of economic 
responsibility. Then, we use that comparison to abstract more 
general components and an aggregate conceptualisation of cor-
porate economic responsibility as a whole (see Table 1, p. 24).
Economic Responsibility of COCs and Shareholder Corporations
Firstly, the owners of COCs are consumers of goods and servic-
es rather than investors of capital. Therefore, it is the members’ 
needs rather than financial capital that constitute the material 
foundation of the COC. Furthermore, the value of the firm to 
a consumer-owner is dependent on the extent and nature of the 
transactional relationship between the consumer and the co-
operative, as opposed to the amount of capital invested. There-
fore, we posit that, rather than perform in a manner consistent 
with maximising per-share earnings as Carroll’s first component 
might dictate, it is important that a COC perform in a manner 
consistent with maximising member earnings per transaction. 
Secondly, a commitment to having the financial ability to 
fulfil the firm’s purpose over time, along with an orientation to-
ward doing so, may be maintained more easily in COCs than 
in shareholder corporations. This is supported by the aspect 
whereby COCs have no activist shareholders and do not face 
great pressure to reach quarterly targets. One manifestation 
of said long-term orientation is that COCs retain some of the 
profit they make – which for a COC constitutes a means to an 
end rather than an end in itself. Profit helps secure the crea-
tion and accumulation of member benefits over time. Accord-
ingly, we propose that, in contrast to commitment (per Car-
roll’s second component) to the highest possible profitability, it 
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is important that a COC show commitment to being profitable 
enough to secure future member benefits. 
Thirdly, COCs are a tool by which consumers (or societies 
as a whole) meet their needs when no other actor is doing so. 
That is, while failures in the consumer market may suit the 
profit-maximising purpose of shareholder corporations, COCs 
exist precisely to counteract such failures. Whereas the idea of 
shareholder corporations is to aim for a strong position (prefer-
ably a monopolistic one) so as to set prices to a level that yields 
maximal profit, the principle of COCs is to gain the power to 
set prices that are close to the production cost. Furthermore, 
COCs are designed to compete so as to increase the consumer 
surplus and are intended to encourage competition that helps 
maintain a well-functioning market. Hence, we posit that, as 
opposed to maintaining a strong competitive position in line 
with the third component of Carroll’s model, it is important for 
a COC to maintain a well-functioning consumer market.
Next, efficiency in COCs is best considered in terms of the 
ratio of total member benefit (output) to the resources used to 
create that benefit (input), as opposed to the profit/input ratio. 
In keeping with their purpose, COCs obtain higher efficiency 
only via appropriate use of productive resources, not by raising 
sales prices, the latter being a means more properly confined to 
shareholder corporations. Rather, this limitation can be taken 
to improve a COC’s efficiency by guiding toward a long-term 
focus on provision of certain goods and services (in a given loca-
tion). Considering this factor, one finds that the next economic 
responsibility on Carroll’s list, maintaining a high level of oper-
ating efficiency, has too little information content to serve as a 
component for any specific context, either shareholder corpora-
tions or COCs; i.e., this component is unlike the above-men-
tioned ones in that it is a general one. Addressing the context of 
our study, we propose that it is important that a COC maintain 
a high overall ratio of member benefit to input as opposed to 
(in line with Carroll’s fourth component) maintaining high op-
erating efficiency and that, rather than maintain a high level of 
operating efficiency (in keeping with the fourth component in 
Carroll’s model), it is important that shareholder corporation 
maintain a high profit/input ratio.
Finally, the way a successful firm is defined influences man-
agers’ mental frames and plans in tandem with the stream of 
actions (praxis) in a given firm. Therefore, a COC could lose 
its way and no longer fulfil its purpose were its success to be 
deemed to hinge on the profit made. Our work speaks in fa-
vour of explicitly articulating the responsibility of COCs to be 
consistently beneficial to their members, while accumulating re-
sources to secure future benefits. Therefore, we propose that, as 
opposed to being defined, per Carroll’s fifth component, as an 
organisation that is consistently profitable, it is important that a 
successful COC be defined as one that is consistently beneficial 
to the members while also nurturing the co-operative.
General Conceptualisation of Economic Responsibilities
When discussing the fourth component of economic respon-
sibility above, we noted that maintaining high operating effi-
ciency could be a responsibility of any corporation. To devise 
a general conceptualisation of corporate economic responsibili-
ties, one must reduce the specificity (or ‘information content’) 
of the model’s other components too, so that only the organi-
sations’ shared characteristics remain. Armed with definitions 
for economic responsibilities suiting shareholder corporations 
and befitting consumer co-operatives, we can now abstract and 
Table 1. Specific and general economic responsibility (Carroll's components and our proposals).
Shareholder-firm-specific 
components COC-specific components General components
It is important to perform in a 
manner consistent with 
maximising earnings per share 
(Carroll’s component)
It is important that a COC perform 
in a manner consistent with 
maximising member earnings per 
transaction (Our proposal)
It is important to perform in a 
manner consistent with satisfying
the owners’ immediate expecta-
tions for economic rewards (Our
proposal)
It is important to be committed to 
being as profitable as possible 
(Carroll’s component)
It is important for a COC to be 
committed to being profitable 
enough to secure future member 
benefits (Our proposal)
It is important to be committed to 
having sufficient profitability to 
ensure capacity to satisfy owners’ 
economic-reward expectations 
over time (Our proposal)
It is important to maintain a strong 
competitive position (Carroll’s 
component)
It is important that a COC 
maintain a well-functioning 
consumer market (Our proposal)
It is important to select a market 
strategy that allows satisfaction of 
owners’ expectations of immediate 
and long-term economic rewards 
(Our proposal)
It is important to maintain a high 
profit/input ratio (Our proposal)
It is important to maintain a high 
benefit/input ratio (Our proposal)
It is important to maintain high 
operation efficiency (Our
proposal)
It is important that a successful 
firm be defined as one that is 
consistently profitable (Our
proposal)
It is important to define a 
successful COC as one that is 
consistently beneficial to the 
members while nurturing the co-
operative (Our proposal)
It is important to define success in 
terms of balance between the 
satisfaction of the owners’ 
immediate and long-term 
expectations of economic rewards 
(Carroll’s component)
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propose more general CER components, while still making use 
of Carroll’s definition work.
1. It is important to perform in a manner consistent with sat-
isfying the owners’ expectations with regard to immediate 
economic rewards
2. It is important to be committed to cultivating the level of 
profitability that entails capacity to satisfy the owners’ ex-
pectations for economic rewards over time 
3. It is important to select a market strategy that allows satis-
fying owners’ immediate and long-term expectations with 
regard to economic rewards 
4. It is important to maintain high operating efficiency 
5. It is important to define success in terms of balance of sat-
isfaction between the owners’ immediate expectations and 
long-term ones for economic rewards
Based on these abstracted components, we propose an aggre-
gate general definition for corporate economic responsibility as 
follows. An economically responsible corporation is one that 
performs in a manner consistent with satisfying the owners’ ex-
pectations related to immediate economic rewards, is commit-
ted to having the level of profitability required for possessing 
the capacity to satisfy those expectations over time, selects the 
appropriate market strategy for doing so, maintains a high level 
of operating efficiency, and defines success in terms of balance 
between immediate and long-term economic rewards with re-
gard to owner expectations.
Discussion and Conclusions
With this paper, we reject the notion that there are purpos-
es that hold for all firms just because they are business firms 
(Abela, 2001), and we have shown that the principles behind 
the consumer co operative form differ dramatically from the 
underpinnings of a shareholder corporation (Jensen & Meck-
ling, 1976). Uncovering the differences between the economic 
responsibilities of shareholder corporations (à la mode de Car-
roll, 1991) and those of COCs has enabled us to articulate cor-
responding proposals based on our qualitative findings. Our 
working definitions of these responsibilities extend scholarly 
knowledge with components of economic responsibility that 
apply to COCs specifically. These lie in parallel to the compo-
nents identified by Carroll (1991), which apply to shareholder 
corporations, with both sets being subordinates to more general 
responsibilities.
Implications for Management and Policy
Since it has been taken for granted that large-scale enterprise 
will be organised in the form of shareholder corporations 
(Hansmann, 1996), it follows that ‘business schools usually base 
their teaching on the assumption that the purpose of the firm 
is to maximize shareholder wealth’ (Fontrodona & Sison, 2006, 
p. 39). In consequence of such tenets as Schwartz and Carroll’s 
statement that when a firm’s ‘activity produces a decline in prof-
its or share value, this may be an indication of a non-economic 
motive, but may also merely represent a flawed business deci-
sion’ (2003, p. 509), typical business-school research and educa-
tion has not addressed itself sufficiently to the task of develop-
ing certain elements of managerial competence that are critical 
to business not designed to maximise profits (e.g., Tuominen 
et al., 2010; cf. Ghoshal, 2005). Therefore, we sometimes see 
business-school graduates act as ‘managers with zebras [who try 
ever] harder to apply the most advanced techniques of horse 
training to their zebras’ (McGahan, 2007, p. 749).
If economic responsibility is defined purely in terms of profit 
maximisation and COC managers follow the corresponding 
guidelines (as we sometimes witness them doing or feeling pres-
sured to do), the co-operative in question is unlikely to real-
ise its purpose. As P. Davis (2001) argues, ‘co operatives lose 
their way and fail as they try to compete on the same terms 
as their investor-led rivals instead of differentiating themselves 
and competing on their own terms’ (p. 32). On account of co-
operatives’ global importance, this is a serious problem. There-
fore, it is vital to have a solid definition of CER that mashes 
with COCs, paving the way too for other conceptualisa¬tions 
and theories that explicitly take account of the co-operation-
based model and what distinguishes it from shareholder cor-
porations. Since the European Foundation for Management 
Development (EFMD, 2011) has taken co-operatives as an ex-
ample of sustainable business, we envision greater attention be-
ing paid to the need for related intellectual framings. That said, 
govern¬ments’ and foundations’ intervention may be necessary 
for ensuring that more research can and will be directed toward 
COCs and co-operatives in general. Thereby, these user-owned 
organisations may gain equal footing with investor-owned com-
panies in business and management education. 
Also, we would expect many government officials and repre-
sentatives of financial and other media to benefit from fuller un-
derstanding of the purpose of co-operatives and their responsi-
bilities, distinct from those of shareholder corporations. Such 
understanding would be especially important for fair compe-
tition. In our view, fair competition exists when no particular 
model of business enterprise has excessive advantage arising 
from, for example, unfair support from the institutional envi-
ronment (this extends to intellectual framings also). Here, we 
have offered some comparisons between shareholder corpora-
tions and COCs that serve the project of unravelling of a few of 
the conceptual and theoretical mysteries of a form of business 
that supports fair and market-correcting competition. 
Much more work is needed for deconstructing the business 
discourses expressing as unquestioned reality that all firms ex-
ist to maximise profit (Duska, 1997). What we call for might 
not be an easy task, given that the shareholder corporation is 
the capitalistic ideal (Hansmann, 1996). However, we have 
touched on several reasons for which the COC model might 
be of interest to society and able to penetrate existing business 
discourses. Co-operatives already occupy a significant role glob-
ally. Perhaps more importantly, the COC model seems to have 
characteristics via which communities can gain some control 
over the market as opposed to ceding all the power to stock 
markets. The model is not based on short-term profit maximi-
sation and mobility of operations and capital, nor does it allow 
speculation as witnessed in stock markets. Instead, a COC oc-
cupies a more traditional role of a business: that of an efficient 
and high-quality provider of goods and services for particular 
consumer markets (cf. Fontrodona & Sison, 2006). One could 
say that COCs anchor services in localities in which sharehold-
er corporations might not display any interest. Furthermore, 
the owners are those most interested in the products and ser-
vices the firm produces and in the company itself (cf. Mintz-
berg et al., 2002), and, under Liljeblom and Vaihe¬koski’s logic 
(2010), also the absence of activist investors promotes orienta-
tion to the longer term.
Directions for Future Research
Our work has highlighted a need to develop ways of measuring 
variables such as member benefit per transaction, total member 
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value, and growth in expected member benefit per transaction. 
Such metrics are of value for evaluation of the extent to which 
COCs succeed in meeting their purpose and responding to 
their economic responsibilities to the members. This challenge 
can be taken up by accounting scholars, for example.
Our research suggests that using profit-based measurements 
to compare efficiencies across COCs and shareholder corpora-
tions is misleading. Price too seems to be a problematic indica-
tor. Therefore, another challenge we can cite is that of find-
ing ways to compare efficiency between these distinct forms 
of business enterprise. Of course, one could legitimately ask 
whether such comparisons are necessary at all, at least with re-
gard to determining some single best way to organise economic 
activities. We believe in the value of a rich landscape of business 
models and in letting fair competition determine what kind of 
model best suits particular market conditions.
We find that work proceeding from the aspects common to 
all corporate forms can lead to more generalisable conceptuali-
sations and theories, as opposed to one focused primarily on the 
model currently dominating the field of business economics – 
today, shareholder corporations.  
As the discussion above indicates, our process applied an 
agency-theory perspective to corporate purpose and economic 
responsibility. In this vein, an interesting question for future re-
search is that of the fundamental difference between sharehold-
ers’ and consumers’ roles as owners. While in shareholder cor-
porations the investors may wait relatively passively for returns 
on the capital invested and developments in share prices, COCs 
require members’ active participation in the value-creation pro-
cesses (cf. Talonen et al., 2016).
Finally, we have not addressed the stakeholder standpoint 
according to which the economic and social purpose of corpo-
rations is to create and distribute increased wealth and value 
to all the primary stakeholder groups. Future work should 
investigate how the owner-centred economic responsibilities 
identified in this paper connect with – and possibly serve as 
the foundation for – other responsibilities of COCs. Here, an 
interesting question is whether COCs and shareholder cor-
porations differ in terms of their relationships with particular 
categories of stakeholders and whether these differences can be 
linked to the enterprises’ roles as creators of value for different 
kinds of owners.
Scholars could also consider the issue of the shareholder 
corporation’s dominant position in academic and business dis-
course. Perhaps this is a matter of politics: this type of company 
is the capitalistic ideal: by definition, the model to be chosen for 
any large-scale business (Hansmann, 1996). If so, any academic 
field should refuse to become stagnant on political grounds. If, 
instead, the domination is a matter of economic theory – in-
deed, models such as the co-operative have disappeared from 
economics textbooks over time (Kalmi, 2007) – organisation 
scientists should be more careful in borrowing from a discipline 
with this failing. Or perhaps the distortion is simply a matter 
of practice: the investor-owned firm is the prevailing model of 
organisation in market economies (Novkovic, 2008), with the 
listed firm in particular being of primary interest to market 
analysts and financial media (Mintzberg et al., 2002) and with 
business discourses maintaining an unquestioned view that all 
firms exist to maximise profit (Duska, 1997). If the issue is one 
of practice, academics should acknowledge the diversity of gov-
ernance forms, speak out to draw attention to this variety, and 
deconstruct the discourses that represent distorted realities of 
business life.
In our view, there is a need for greater understanding of busi-
ness organisations that are inherently not maximisers of (short-
term) profit or targets of speculative trading. Our thinking on 
this is rooted in several ideas. Duska (1997), for one, maintains 
that ‘the appeal to profit was a means to motivate more produc-
tion, but it was not the purpose of production’ originally but 
that, over time, ‘the means of motivation in some way became 
confused with the purpose of business’ (p. 1408). Accordingly, 
research devoted to businesses that are fundamentally linked 
back to people’s actual needs rather than investors’ endless ap-
petite for more money is warranted. One might ask about sus-
tainability from a consumer (community) angle: which model of 
business enterprise is likely to safeguard long-term provision of 
services in a particular consumer market? Dyllick and Hockerts 
(2002), on the other hand, address a different idea of sustain-
ability, stating that we have seen firms overemphasising ‘short-
term gains by concentrating more on quarterly results than the 
foundation for long term success’ (p. 132). In addition, it has 
been observed that speculative traders are not interested even in 
a firm’s short-term profits; their attention is more on dramatic 
swings in the share price that allow them to make money both 
‘uphill’ and ‘downhill.’ This acts against economic sustainability 
(Mintzberg et al., 2002), which we define as a firm’s financial 
ability to sustain fruitful pursuit of its purpose.
This paper has demonstrated that COCs are driven by con-
sumer needs and, thereby, fill a historically important role of 
the business as provider of goods and services to the market-
place. We have shown that COCs exist to serve particular con-
sumer markets so are sustainable from a consumer/community 
point of view in the sense that they will not take their opera-
tions elsewhere. Furthermore, our work has clarified that the 
relationship between the firm and the owner in COCs is likely 
to be anything but speculative, as the consumer-owners can-
not obtain value through stock trading. We also stress that the 
co-operative itself, in its efficiency and service quality, is impor-
tant to those consumers whose value of ownership is derived 
through use. Finally, we have revealed that overemphasis on 
short-term gains is still possible in co-operatives – for example, 
in terms of ‘right-now’ consumer price reductions – while at the 
same time explaining why short-term emphasis and excessive 
risk-taking are unlikely in COCs.
Finally, conceptualising the CER of COCs is a means to a 
contribution on a higher plane. That is, contrasting the mean-
ings of CER for a co-operative with what is found in Carroll’s 
definition helps us consider the form-specific details appropri-
ately, so that only the aspects common to all business forms 
remain. While Carroll’s definition remains useful for the most 
part in the context of shareholder corporations, we developed a 
more general definition of CER, which we hope encourages fur-
ther research. We hope also that our example motivates schol-
ars of various key phenomena central to business economics to 
engage in processes of abstraction that address examples from 
two or more models of business enterprise rather than merely 
one. 
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